ABOUT CONFERENCE
NORMATIVITY AND PRAXIS: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS, 14-16.05.2025
For Kant, philosophy of religion is a topic of paramount importance. He addresses it particularly in the writing Religion within the Limits of Reason alone (1793), in the spirit of the Enlightenment: Kant vehemently opposes all forms of speculative exuberance, superstition, spiritual fanaticism and revelation-based dogmatism. Instead, Kant attempts to limit religion to that which can be defended by the means of reason. Kant is of the opinion that religious rules and revealed commandments are only philosophically acceptable to the extent that they can be reconciled with the demands of reason and morality. For example, there is no room for belief in miracles (RGV VI.84–89). This immediately raises the question: are philosophical efforts to radically rationalize religions and reduce them to a reasonable moral foundation, beyond all differences, reasonable themselves?
The conference will pursue a number of key scholarly objectives. These objectives are, first and foremost, (1) an examination of Kant's understanding of religion (i.e., the significance of the distinction between “a religion of devine service” and “a purely moral religion” as well as the distinction between “ecclesiastical faith” and “pure religious faith”). For this investigation, it is also important to consider problem (2) of the connection between the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of history in Kant's philosophy (because by linking these issues, it becomes possible to understand human history as a process in which we are dealing with progress). In the hitherto existing reception of Kant's philosophy of religion, (3) the question of the political significance of religion, as expressed in Kant's writings (e.g. his view that “religion is a primary political need” [AA VII, 11]), has been insufficiently considered. One important scholarly topic to be addressed at the planned conference is (4) Habermas's view of the relationship between faith and reason, which is much discussed today. Likewise, one will not be able to overlook (5) the seemingly paradoxical statements of Kant, who on the one hand says: “morality [...] is in need neither of the idea of another being above him [the human being] in order that he recognize his duty, nor, that it observe it, of an incentive other than the law itself” (VI, 3); on the other hand, he says: “Morality [...] inevitably leads to religion” (AA VI, 6). One will also not be able to avoid (6) the extremely difficult questions about the philosophical value of Kant's analyses of Judaism in the Religionsschrift, as well as the questions about the interpretations of Kant's views themselves, and to answer them reliably.
How do we stand today in relation to Kant's position – especially with regard to the discussion about religion in the public space? Since a plurality of religions exists in modern Western societies, which are incompatible with each other but privatized for the sake of freedom from conflict, a requirement of neutrality applies to liberal states. But to what point exactly should the state's requirement of neutrality extend? Does the state merely have to guard against one-sided partisanship, or must it also be secular in an active sense (as we know it from France)? What is Kant's solution, and what can we consider acceptable under present-day conditions?
Answering these questions is important both in terms of a general reflection on the coherence or relevance of Kant's Enlightenment attitude towards religion and with regard to the question of how we stand in relation to religion today and how we see its place in the public sphere.
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
- Paul Guyer - Jonathan Nelson Professor emeritus of Humanities and Philosophy, Brown University.
- Christoph Horn - Professor and Director of Practical Philosophy and Ancient Philosophy at the University of Bonn.
- Heiner F. Klemme - Professor of Philosophy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg.
FEES
The conference is open to active participation (with a paper) and passive participation (without a paper).
A conference fee of:
- 400 zł (90 euro) for faculty and research staff
- 200 zł (45 euro) for students (including Ph.D. students)
should be paid by the7.05.2025 via a bank transfer to the following account:
83 1240 3028 1111 0011 4849 4748
for foreign transfers:
IBAN: PL83 1240 3028 1111 0011 4849 4748
BIC/SWIFT: PKOPPLPW
with the following description: konferencja THE ROLE OF RELIGION
Passive participation in the conference is free of charge.
REGISTRATION
Registration is required for both active participants (with paper) and passive participants. Registration should be done using the registration form.
ABSTRACTS
- Paul Guyer
Freedom in practice: Kant on freedom of press, religion, and inquiry
Freedom of pen and press, of religion, and the underlying freedom of inquiry are the forms of freedom with which Kant was most concerned in the political context (and with which we continue to need to be deeply concerned). For Kant these forms of freedom follow directly from the innate right to freedom, and need no further justification, as for example in J.S. mill's utilitarian approach. I analyze the rights and duties of both governed and governors that arise from these duties. - Heiner F. Klemme –Theorie und Praxis des „guten Lebenswandels“. Zur Problemstellung von Kants Schrift „Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft“
Based on reflections on the interpretation of the title of Kant's Religion, I argue that Kant’s intention in that work was both negative-critical and positive-critical. The negative-critical intention states that we can lead a life pleasing to God only through moral action. The positive-critical intention states that, within certain limits, religion can make a significant contribution to our moral actions, although articles of faith and religious practices cannot be derived from pure reason. It becomes apparent that, in the Religion, Kant not only seeks to overcome the difference between the theory and practice of our moral actions “in theory,” but also strives to exert a direct influence on the moral actions of his contemporaries and on state action. The linchpin concept of this work proves to be that of “good life conduct” (“guter Lebenswandel”). - Jürgen Brunner
Kant über die Freiheit zum Bösen und Irrationalen
In meinem Beitrag geht es um die handlungstheoretischen Grundlagen von Immanuel Kants Konzeption einer Freiheit zum Bösen und Irrationalen. Als Interpretationshilfe habe ich Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Vermögenspsychologie verwendet. Ich argumentiere für drei Thesen:
(1) Baumgarten und Kant vertreten das libertarische Anderskönnen unter gegebenen Umständen. Das Anderskönnen ist allerdings nicht das Definiens von moralischer Freiheit. Das Definitionskriterium ist die Fähigkeit zur Autonomie. Baumgartens und Kants Freiheitskonzeption interpretiere ich als akteurskausal und fähigkeitsbasiert.
(2) Kants Begriff der transzendentalen Freiheit kann als Weiterentwicklung der fähigkeitsbasierten (vermögenspsychologischen) Freiheitskonzeption Baumgartens verstanden werden. Baumgarten definiert freie Selbstdetermination (determinatio libera) als freiwillige Selbstverpflichtung (necessitatio). Nach Kant sind wir transzendental frei, weil wir zur Autonomie fähig sind. Irrationale und böse Handlungen lassen sich als zurechenbarer Verzicht auf Autonomie und als vorwerfbare Entscheidung für Heteronomie auffassen.
(3) Kant vertritt im Anschluss an Baumgarten einen graduellen Freiheitsbegriff. Der Grad der aktualisierten Freiheit hängt von der moralischen Motivation ab. In absteigender Reihenfolge lassen sich drei Grade differenzieren: Moralität (Handlungen rein aus Pflicht), Legalität (Unlauterkeit) und vorsätzliche Pflichtverletzungen (Bösartigkeit). Kant knüpft unmittelbar an Baumgartens graduellen Freiheitsbegriff an. Eine Handlung erfolgt Baumgarten zufolge nur dann nach reiner Freiheit (libertas pura), wenn keine anderen Handlungsmotive außer der objektiven Verpflichtung (moralitas obiectiva) eine Rolle spielen. Der Grad der Freiheitseinschränkung ist nach Baumgarten abhängig von dem Anteil an beigemischter sinnlicher Willkür (arbitrium sensitivum) und von der introspektiven Intransparenz der Triebfedern (elateres animi). - Michael Kühnlein
Die Entdeckung der Liebenswürdigkeit.Kant aktualisiert Habermas[The discovery of kindness. Kant updates Habermas]
[GER] Bekanntlich lehnt Habermas die Kantische Postulatenlehre als funktionalistisch ab. Deshalb muss sie aus seiner Sicht auch nicht erst in säkulare Lernprozesse der Vernunft übersetzt werden, allenfalls kann sie dadurch ersetzt werden. In seinen Spätschriften setzt Kant jedoch eine andere Pointe. Am Beispiel der Liebenswürdigkeit, den Kant gegen einen dogmatischen Säkularismus ins Felde führt, verteidigt er den liberalen Mehrwert einer christlichen Denkungsart unter nachmetaphysischen Bedingungen der Moderne.
[ENG] As is well known, Habermas rejects Kant's doctrine of postulates as functionalist. Therefore, in his view, it does not need to be translated into secular learning processes of reason; at best, it can be replaced by them. In his late writings, however, Kant sets a different point. Using the example of kindness, which Kant uses against dogmatic secularism, he defends the liberal added value of a Christian way of thinking under the post-metaphysical conditions of modernity. - Guido Löhrer
Kant über moralisches Umdenken: Konversion and Revision in der Religionsschrift [Kant on Moral Rethinking: Conversion and Reversion in Religion]
[GER] Moral und die Idee eines höchsten Gutes führen unumgänglich zur Religion, behauptet Kant im ersten Stück der Religionsschrift. Denn für dieses Gut bedarf es eines Gottes, der Glückseligkeit nach dem Maß menschlicher Glückswürdigkeit ausschüttet, und für die Glückswürdigkeit einer Maxime, die die Willkür sich für den Gebrauch ihrer Freiheit auferlegt. Mit Letzterem stellt sich nicht nur die Frage, wie eine Triebfeder Gegenstand einer Maxime sein kann. Kant handelt sich damit auch ein veritables Problem mit dem Ursprung des subjektiven Grunds dieses Freiheitsgebrauchs ein. Dessen Lösung entwirft er sowohl als Revision in einem unendlichen Progress als auch als jähe Konversion oder Revolution der Gesinnung. Beide Formen moralischen Umdenkens sollen sich als miteinander vereinbar erweisen, wenn man wiederum Religion voraussetzt oder zumindest einen göttlichen Eternalismus. Doch dürfte der Ansatz mehr Probleme aufwerfen, als er löst.
[ENG] Morality and the idea of a supreme good inevitably lead to religion, Kant claims in the first part of his Religionsschrift. For this good requires a God who distributes happiness according to the human being’s worthiness to be happy, and for the worthiness to be happy a moral maxim which the power of choice imposes on itself for the exercise of its freedom. The latter not only raises the question of how an incentive can be the subject of a maxim. Kant thus also faces a serious problem regarding the origin of the subjective ground for that exercise of freedom. He outlines his solution both as a revision in an infinite progress and as a radical conversion or revolution in disposition. Both types of moral rethinking are thought to prove compatible with each other if one presupposes religion or at least a divine eternalism. However, this approach is likely to raise more problems than it solves. - Justyna Nowotniak-Poręba
Der Streit des reinen Religionsglaubens mit dem Kirchenglauben
Den reinen Vernunftglauben setzt Kant als die gemeinsame Ebene im Streit der zwei Glaubensweisen, die den Frieden zwischen beiden möglich macht. Der Geschichtsglaube soll stufenweise alles Äußere des Gottesdienstes abwerfen und die Menschen würden nur die unsichtbare Kirche, i.e. ein ethisches gemeines Wesen bauen. Dieser philosophischen Vorstellung steht aber der wirkliche Streit beider Glaubensweisen entgegen. Der Kirchenglaube wehrt sich mit seinen Statuten gegen die rein vernünftige Begründung der Moral, die in einer guten Lebensweise besteht und keine Gnadenwirkungen voraussetzt. Im Gegensatz dazu sucht der Kirchengläubige, durch Afterdienst Gott gefälling zu werden. Es fragt sich, ob der auf Gewissenszwang und Ritualen beruhende Religionsglaube nicht auf der Seite des Bösen im Sinne der verkehrten Ordnung der Maximen des Handelns steht. - Wojciech Kozyra
Kant’s Moral Ecclesiology
Contrary to what the actual status questionis might suggest (studies devoted to the subject are scarce), Kant has an elaborate ecclesiology, or theory of the Church. He operates with traditional Christian ecclesiological categories; especially when he distinguishes between the visible Church (ecclesia visibilis), the invisible Church (ecclesia invisibilis), the Church militant (ecclesia militans), and the Church triumphant (ecclesia triumphans). Despite his criticism of religion based on history and ritual, Kant emphasizes the importance of the visible Church as an agent of enlightenment and defines – in moral terms – the marks of its veracity, which is meant to enable the identification of the true visible Church in history. Kant develops his ecclesiology with an awareness of, and in contrast to, the Pietist tradition, as well as the Lockean understanding of the Church which in Germany found support from thinkers such as Moses Mendelssohn and Gottfried Achenwall. My contribution will present Kant’s notion of the Church in its proper context, and in particular will focus on a seemingly paradoxical consequence of Kant’s moralized ecclesiology: its exclusivity. - Beatrice Sasha Kobow
The Inner Freedom of the Categorical Imperative and the Need for a Moral Community
In 'Träume eines Geistersehers', Kant rejects the idea that we can know anything about an afterlife, but remarks ironically that any judgment about our performance will depend on how well we have managed our position in this life. For Kant, this performance is a careful balancing act between our public post and the private development of our freedom. In 'Geisterseher', he refers us to Candide's garden, in 'Was ist Aufklärung?' he points us towards the shared space of a self-enlightening public (with its organs, such as newspapers). I would like to investigate Herta Nagl-Docekal's interpretation of 'inner freedom' as she criticises Habermas and Rawls and focuses on Kant's notion of a community which is 'church-like' and on which we depend for our moral standing as individuals. This, I believe, will allow a speculation as to who might be considered 'the judges' of our performance - it is contemporary and future participants of this community of moral agents. It is they we have in mind when formulating the categorical imperative as a guardrail of our individual exercise of freedom (in its various existing and further formulations and application to our actions). - Trevor Wedman
Faith - Revelation - Reason
The distinction between faith and reason presents a dichotomy reaching back to Kant’s exclusion of religion from theoretical reason, and perhaps even to Luther’s insistence on sola fide and sola scriptura. More recently, the encyclical Fides et Ratio sought to reconcile faith with reason in arguing that faith without reason leads to superstition while reason without faith leads to relativism or even nihilism. However, Habermas, responding in part to Benedict XVI’s Regensburg Lecture, has called into question the need for such a reconciliation of faith with reason in an age which has seen the arrival of secular reason. The modern scientific, ‘post-metaphysical’ worldview, Habermas seems to indicate, constitutes its own discourse while needing neither faith nor reason as traditionally conceived. The proposed contribution will use the occasion of Habermas’ critique to evaluate and question the faith-reason dichotomy within Kant’s critical writings. It will seek to resolve the dichotomy by resorting to Hermann Cohen’s notion of revelation and “second-law” as found in his “Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums”. Here ‘revelation’, law, or even normativity proves itself as the transcendental coin of which faith and reason are merely the sides. - Aleksander Bobko
Kant's political thinking
In this article I attempt to show a connection between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his political thinking. It means, that political thinking can build a specific relationship between the sphere of nature (theoretical reason) and freedom (practical reason). As a result the highest political good (eternal peace), which should be achieved by humanity, can be interpreted as the most complete form of rationality, whose source is reason. The realization of such a goal can only be thought of hypothetically. - Christoph Horn
How to understand Kant’s philosophy of history?
Kant’s philosophy of history has always presented considerable difficulties of interpretation for its readers. When we look at the relevant texts we certainly receive the impression that Kant seriously wants to defend a relatively unambiguous position in relation to the philosophy of history; and at the very least he seems throughout to endorse the basic thought that the course of history exhibits a specific logic that is bound up with the development of human capacities and with the idea of political progress; and he always holds that some kind of cosmopolitan social and political order stands at the end of history. On the other hand, this position does not seem to sit particularly well with Kant’s other philosophical convictions either in the context of his theoretical or of his practical philosophy. For Kant makes concessions to certain positions (usually regarded as quite un-Kantian) which involve a ‘metaphysical dogmatism’, such as a Stoic conception of natural teleology, an Aristotelian essentialism, a perfectionism in relation to the human species, and a providential theology. He also repeatedly speaks of ‘nature’ as if human history unfolded under its guidance or even in an ‘automatic’ or ‘mechanical’ manner. These are all claims which seem to threaten Kant’s central idea of moral autonomy. - Bartosz Wesół
Religion, Ethics and Practical Reality
In my talk, I will argue that the alleged paradox between the statements that “morality” does not need “the idea of another being above” the human being (AA VI, 3); and that it “inevitably leads to religion” (AA VI, 6) can be better understood from the perspective of, often ambiguous, Kantian conceptions of reality (Realität), practical reality (praktische Realität), and existence (Existenz) in reference to God.
The main shift between the First and the Second Critique is marked by the fact that in the former Kant denies the possibility of proving the existence of God, but in the latter grounds the practical reality of the postulates of practical reason. This creates tension, which is also apparent in his further philosophical writings.
In my view, the notion of practical reality is the key to understanding the relationship between ethics and religion in Kant. Even in the Critique of Pure Reason, he struggles with the notion of existence in saying that as a category of modality it is only “subjectively synthetic” (A234) and can be “objectified” by the universal appeal to other subjects. In the theoretical domain, the synthetic connection between a real object and a (subjective) concept is established through sensual intuition.
In the practical domain, the objectivity of the postulates is ensured by the universality of the moral law, the synthetic connection is established by the actions of the will. The former corresponds to ethics which is only concerned with the universal rules of conduct, the latter however entails embodying the moral law in practice which is the gist of Kant’s understanding of religion. - Seniye Tilev
Faith and Teleology: Kant on the Rational Completeness of Morality
In this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, the rational completeness of morality is achieved through moral faith, as it provides a context for moral experience. A common misconception about religiously oriented readings of the highest good is to see it merely as a divine reward for the virtuous in eternity. Both secular readers and those admitting the regulative force of faith often ignore its significance for present affairs, overemphasizing motivation or psychological consolation based on a future promise of happiness. I argue that critical religiosity, focused on realizing the highest good in this world, seeks harmony between nature and morals through reflective judgment. This immanent hope for a teleological conception of moral experience complements the ideal moral world, even if we remain agnostic about its full realization.
In the third Critique, teleology—including the intentionality of the divine author of morals and nature—plays a substantial role beyond guaranteeing future happiness. Moral attachment to the claim of the highest good operates within present moral experience, regardless of its fulfillment in a future world. Teleologically considered, the highest good becomes not only the final end but “a supreme cause of the world” (KU 5:444). Although it proves nothing for the nonbeliever, it establishes unity between nature and morals. In this moral view, God is not a future judge but an idea uniting all states of affairs here, now, and beyond. Neither the duty to promote the highest good nor the moral law loses bindingness without rational faith, but rational completeness suffers as reason loses alliances in nature and history. Reason would remain imprisoned in pure rationality, shattering the efficacy of moral agency.
Thus, Kant contends that “the final purpose that morality imposes upon us cannot exist without theology, for then reason would be at a loss with regard to that final end” (KU 5:484). If the agent views life as being thrown into blind nature and death as a return to chaos (KU 5:452), her moral domain collapses. More than losing motivation or consolation, the agent loses relation to her own purposiveness voiced in the moral law. Kant’s moral teleology concerns reason’s inherent purposiveness, demanding actualization. The idea of God does not serve as a mere gap-filler or psychological comfort but constitutes a substantial part of moral experience. Thus, for the virtuous atheist, morality cannot realize any systematic, comprehensive harmony.
THE STATUE OF THE CONFERENCE
The Statue of the Conference is available here: https://tinyurl.com/rmr4cku4 (in Polish), https://tinyurl.com/5bxxfwuk (in English).
ORGANISERS & SPONSORS
- The project is funded by the Polish Academy of Sciences and the German-Polish Science Foundation (Deutsch-Polnische Wissenschaftsstiftung).
- Kant-Gesellschaft e.V.
- Polish Academy of Sciences, Łódź Branch / Ethics Commission
- University of Łódź, Department of Ethics, Institute of Philosophy
- Polish Philosophical Society, Łódź Branch
- Honorary Patronage of the Rector of the University of Łódź
- University of Bonn, Institute of Philosophy
PAST CONFERENCES
- 2024: Kant and his significance for the present – Kant und seine Bedeutung für die Gegenwart
- 2022: Visions of good life in the Antiquity – physical, spiritual and social. Ancient Medicine and Philosophy
- 2021: Christianity and Democracy / Christentum und Demokratie
- 2019: Celebrating the philosophical and intellectual achievements of Jürgen Habermas / Philosoph und Intellektueller in Zeiten des Umbruchs. Zur Würdigung des Werks von Jürgen Habermas aus Anlass seines 90. Geburtstages
- 2018: Europe as an Idea and as a Viable Project founded on «Logos» / Europa als eine Idee und als ein tragfähiges Projekt gegründet auf «Logos»
- 2017: Früherer und Zeitgenössischer Sinn und Begriff von Weisheit
- 2016: The Idea and the Practice of Republicanism
- 2015: Moral Universalism and Non-ideal Normativity / Nichtideale Normativität
- 2014: Human Rights: from Theoretical Justifications to Dilemmas of Practical Applications
MEDIA
In 2010, prior to the launch of the cyclical conference under the name of 'Normativity & Practice', the Department of Ethics, within the framework of the project The Topicality and Practical Significance of Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of State and Law (project number: N101249434 [2494/B/H03/2008/34]), organised the international conference 'The Topicality of Kant's Philosophy of State and Law', which was thematically related to the conference The Role of Religion in Kant's Political Philosophy and Ethics. On the occasion of the 2010 conference, Ewa Wyrębska, M.A., then a Ph.D. student and assistant at the Department of Ethics at the University of Lodz, interviewed the following speakers of that conference: Prof. Paul Guyer, Prof. Reinharden Brandt, Prof. Bernd Ludwig and Prof. Alessandro Pinzani.